Dino-mite!

Today's DJ has Justice Hoffstadt's 'Jurassic' Wisdom:

Traditionally, questions reviewed by appellate courts fall into one of three categories: (1) questions of law, (2) questions of fact, or (3) mixed questions of law and fact.

Questions of law call upon an appellate court to decide what the law is. Appellate courts do not defer to a trial court's rulings on questions of law, and thus employ the nondeferential "de novo" standard of review. People v. Waidla, 22 Cal. 4th 690, 730 (2000). Why? Because appellate courts have "'several'" "'[s]tructural[]'" "'advantages over trial courts in deciding questions of law'" -- chiefly, they have more time to consider such questions and they sit in three- or seven-judge panels (and multiple heads are better than one). People v. Louis, 42 Cal. 3d 969, 986 (1986), superseded on other grounds, People v. Mickey, 54 Cal. 3d 612 (1991); People v. Haworth, 50 Cal. 4th 372, 384 (2010). De novo review also allows appellate courts to speak more freely and thus unify precedent. United States v. Ornelas, 517 U.S. 690, 697-98 (1996).

Questions of fact call upon an appellate court to review the trial court's findings regarding "historical" facts (that is, what happened) and questions of credibility. People v. Cromer, 24 Cal. 4th 889, 900 (2001); Haworth at 384. Appellate courts generally defer to a trial court's findings of fact, and thus employ the deferential "substantial evidence" standard of review. Haworth at 384. Under this standard, a finding of historical fact must be affirmed unless, when the record is viewed in the light most favorable to that finding, there is no "reasonable, credible evidence" to permit a "reasonable trier of fact" to make that finding, People v. Barnwell, 41 Cal. 4th 1038, 1052 (2007); In re George T., 33 Cal. 4th 620, 630-31 (2004), and a credibility finding cannot be "reevaluat[ed]" and must be affirmed unless the content of the witness's testimony was "physically impossible" or its truth or falsity evident without resort to inferences or deductions, People v. D'Arcy, 48 Cal. 4th 257, 293 (2010); People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 150 (1975). Importantly, this deference traditionally applies "whether the trial court's [factual finding] is based on oral testimony or declarations." Shamblin v. Brattain, 44 Cal. 3d 474, 479 (1988); Haraguchi v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 4th 706, 711 (2008).

Why this level of deference to a trial court's factual findings? The answer is twofold. First, trial courts -- at least vis-à-vis appellate courts -- "are in a better position" to "evaluate and weigh the evidence" and "to assess witness credibility." Haraguchi at 713; Haworth at 385. Second, tasking the trial courts with making factual findings relieves appellate courts of "the burden of a full-scale independent review and evaluation of the evidence," thereby "conserving" their time for the legal issues "that appellate courts ... are best situated to decide." Louis at 986; Haworth at 385.

Mixed questions of law and fact "concern the application of the rule to the facts and the consequent determination whether the rule is satisfied." Haworth at 384. Whether appellate courts will defer to a trial court's ruling on a mixed question depends upon whether it is "predominantly legal" (that is, when the question "requires a critical consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their underlying values") or "predominantly factual" (that is, when the question turns on "the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human conduct" or "human affairs"). Crocker Nat'l Bank v. City & County of San Francisco, 49 Cal. 3d 881, 888 (1989); Louis at 987; Waidla at 730-31. Appellate courts review the former independently, and the latter solely for substantial evidence. Haworth at 385; Crocker at 888.