Dhillon v. John Muir Health begins:
As a general rule, a litigant may appeal an adverse ruling only after the trial court renders a final judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1.) The question in this case concerns the application of this general rule when a trial court has granted a petition for writ of administrative mandamus and remanded the matter for proceedings before an administrative body. The issuance of the writ did not definitively resolve the dispute between the parties, but it did mark the end of the writ proceeding in the trial court. Is the court's order an appealable final judgment? We conclude that it is, and we reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Also in today's DJ, certified family law and appellate specialist Claudia Ribet offers Is it appealable in family law, or not? Ruling provides guidance.
Although many lawyers believe that anything after a trial on the merits is appealable under Code of Civil Procedure Section 904.1(a)(2), it is well established that temporary custody orders are not appealable. Lester v. Lennane, 84 Cal. App. 4th 536, 559 (2000). Stupp v. Schilders, 2017 DJDAR 4605 (Cal. App. 1st Dist., May 18, 2017), makes clear that not all post-judgment orders are not appealable because, although they follow an earlier judgment, they "are more accurately understood as being preliminary to a later judgment, at which time they will become ripe for appeal."Also of interest today, the 4th Circuit's opinion in the travel ban case, IRAP v. Trump, in which many SoCal appellate lawyers participated as amici. (Good luck trying to access it right now; the 4th Cir. website appears to be overwhelmed... try here) Here's the opening paragraph:
The question for this Court, distilled to its essential form, is whether the Constitution, as the Supreme Court declared in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120 (1866), remains “a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace.” And if so, whether it protects Plaintiffs’ right to challenge an Executive Order that in text speaks with vague words of national security, but in context drips with religious intolerance, animus, and discrimination. Surely the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment yet stands as an untiring sentinel for the protection of one of our most cherished founding principles—that government shall not establish any religious orthodoxy, or favor or disfavor one religion over another. Congress granted the President broad power to deny entry to aliens, but that power is not absolute. It cannot go unchecked when, as here, the President wields it through an executive edict that stands to cause irreparable harm to individuals across this nation. Therefore, for the reasons that follow, we affirm in substantial part the district court’s issuance of a nationwide preliminary injunction as to Section 2(c) of the challenged Executive Order.